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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, BY AND 
THROUGH UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT 
OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
Vs. 
Case No. 18988 
JOHN DICK, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal to determine the appropriate forum for en-
forcement of a child's right for care and support from its father, 
pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45a-l et seq., when the father is under 18 
years of age. 
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The State of Utah, Department of Social Services, filed suit 
against Defendant-Appellant in Third District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. Defendant-Appellant filed a Motion for 
an Order Releasing Jurisdiction to the Juvenile Court. Said Motion 
was denied by Order of the Third District Court Judge, Timothy R. 
Hanson. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the Third District Court's 
ruling and Order. 
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STATEHENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts recited by 
Appellant in Part A and B of his Statement with the exception that 
the Complaint does not, nor has Respondent ever, alleged that Appel_ 
ant has "violated" the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS ACTION DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
JUVENILE COURT, BUT IS PROPERLY BROUGHT IN THE DISTRICT COURT. 
The present action against Appellant is a civil proceeding 
pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45a-l, et seq., the Uniform Act on Paternity 
It is not a criminal action nor a quasi-criminal 
action that corresponded to U.C.A. §77-60-1 et seq., Bastardy Act 
(repealed 1980). This Court has consistently recognized that paterm: 
suits are civil in nature; even when brought pursuant to the now 
repealed Bastardy Act. See eg, Brown v. Marrelli, 527 P.2d 230. 
It is to be noted that the Uniform Act on Paternity does not create 
a new cause of action that did not exist previously, it merely es-
tablishes a procedural mechanism for the enforcement of a child's lor,: 
recognized right of care and support from its father; see eg. Rees v 
Archibald, 311 P. 2d 788 (1957) ("This court has invariably emphasize( 
the father's obligation to support his children based upon the elernen· 
ary principal that the law imposes upon those who bring children int 
the world the duty to care for and support them during their minorir 
and dependency." id. at 789). 
Appellant argues that because he was under the age of eightEl 
when this action was filed, the action should be brought in Juvenile 
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IL>Urt by mandate of U .C .A. § 78-3a-16(1), the Juvenile Court Act 
Appellant contends that the statutory language is 
clear. Respondent agrees that the statutory language is clear; 
§78-3a-16 does read in pertinent part: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, the [Juvenile) 
Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in 
proceedings: (1) concerning any child who has violated 
any,,federal, state or local law or municipal ordinance, 
It is clear from the Juvenile Court Act that the legislature, in 
enacting this provision, intended for the Juvenile Court to deal 
with violations of criminal laws and ordinances. This is clearly 
shown by the list of possible dispositions of a case within the 
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. §78-3a-39 reads in pertinent 
part: 
"When a child is found to come within the provisions 
of section 78-3a-16, the [Juvenile] Court shall so ad-
judicate, and make a finding of the facts upon which it 
basis its jurisdiction over the child provided, however, 
that in cases found to be within the provisions of 
section 78-3a-16(1), findings of fact shall not be 
necessary. Upon such adjudication, the court may make the 
following disposition by court order: 
(1) The Court may place the child on probation or under 
protective supervision ... 
(2) The court may place the child in the legal custody 
of a relative or other suitable person, ... 
(3) The court may vest legal custody of the child in the 
state division of family services or other public agency, 
department, or institution, or in a child placement agency ... 
(4) The court may commit the child to the state youth 
development center or other similar institution ... 
(5) The court may commit ... the child to temporary 
custody of the state youth correction agency ... " 
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All of these possible dispositions show the intent of the 
to provide an alternative form for rehabilitation of minors chargec 
with criminal violations. This is also reflected in the exception 
contained in the section cited, that no fin dings of fact are necess. 
ary if jurisdiction is pursuant to §78-3a-16(1) and the Juvenile 
Court's practice of not making such findings in cases where the 
minor has been charged with criminal violations. Nothing is added 
to Appellant's argument through reference to other jurisdictions 
in that the purpose of their statutes is the same as Utah's pur-
pose in passing the Juvenile Court Act: alternative rehabilitation 
of juveniles who have violated criminal ordinances/laws. 
Appellant has consistently stated in his argument that the 
Juvenile Court has "exclusive, original jurisdiction where a child 
has violated any state law" and posits that Appellant has "violated' 
Utah law simply because his child's right to care and support is 
being enforced pursuant to the Uniform Act on Paternity, U.C.A. 
§78-45a-l et seq., and that the Juvenile Court Act does not provide 
concurrent or alternative jurisdiction in some other court for such 
"violation". Appellant 's entire argument miss es the mark. Appell-
ant has not been charged with violating any law or ordinance. The 
allegations of the Complaint filed herein are essentially that 
Appellant is the father of a child born out of wedlock and that 
Appellant has a duty to assist, within Appellant's ability, in the 
support of the child. As noted previously, this is simply the 
enforcement of Appellant's moral obligation to support his child T' -
fallacy of Appellant's argument is shown by its application to other 
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. i rrumstances where a defendant is under the age of 18 when his 
act ions give rise to legal suit: l. Should an individual, under 
the age of 18, stay upon or in property and, thus, to use Appellant's 
argument, "violate" the Unlawful Deatiner Act, U.C.A. §78-36-1, 
legal action to evict such an individual would have to be brought 
in Juvenile Court. 2. The lll1der 18 year old, who gets a summer 
job as a laborer on a construction site and who, through his neglig-
ence, causes injury or death to an individual on the construction 
site and, thus to use Appellant's argument, "violates" the Wrong-
ful Death Act,U.C.A. §78-11-12 et seq., would have to be sued in 
Juvenile Court for his liability for the injuries caused by his 
acts. 3. The individual who is injured by a product made or 
designed by the enterprising, bright high-school "WIZ KID" would have 
to bring suit in Juvenile Court, since to use Appellant's argument, 
the high schooler has "violated" the Product Liability Act, U .C .A. 
§78-15-1 et seq. Respondent could continue the list, e.g., claims 
for personal injury and property damage arising from traffic accidents 
being filed in Juvenile Court of one if the drivers were lll1der 18 
years of age, but believes its point has been made; jurisdiction of 
the Juvenile Court, under U.C.A. §78-3a-16(1), occurs when a person 
under the age of 18 is charged with a criminal violation. Analogus 
reasoning was done by this Court in State v. Dlll1g Hlll1g Jo, 585 P.2d 
·•o4 There, this Court noted that the actions of the minor child 
''ere violations of no law and the asserted jurisdiction over the 
Defendant was not within the purview of the Juvenile Court Acts' 
jurisdictional sections. 
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Appellant himself glosses over the Juvenile Court Act's 
specific language found in §78-3a-l6 which states: "excpet as othei 
wise provided by law, .. The Uniform Act on Paternity states 
specifically, at U.C.A. §78-45a-5(1), "The district court has juris-
diction of an action under this act ... " Within the language of the 
Juvenile Court Act and the Uniform Act on Paternity, this action is 
within the jurisdiction of the District Court, not the Juvenile 
Court. 
Appellant attempts to buttress his argument by stating that 
the action of the District Court will be "mechanistic and unyielding 
the Court will not"refer to the age, status or background of the 
parents." This may be due to the fact that Appellant is unable to 
follow the sections of the Uniform Act on Paternity which indicate 
that provisions of the other "child support" acts are availalbe for 
use in actions brought under the Uniform Act on Paternity. By 
following these inclusionary provisions, one finds that the Distric 
Court must, in setting Appellant's support obligation, 
"consider all relevant factors including but not limited 
to: 
(a) the standard of living and the situtation of the 
parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties· 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support 
of others." 
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,, r: ,\ § 78-45- 7 (2) (Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act). 
CONCLUSION 
The statutory language of each relevant act and the legis-
lative purpose and intent in enacting these acts clearly show that 
an action to have the father of a child provide care and support, 
within that father's ability, for his child is to be brought in the 
District Court, even if the father is under 18 years of age. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this of June, 1983. 
TED CANNON, Salt Lake County Attorney 
SANDY MOOY, 
County Attorney 
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